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The paper develops two main linked themes: (i) strategic planning reveals in practice limits that are hard to overcome; (ii) a 
complete planning system is efficacy only in the framework of a republican political, social and government culture. It is 
argued that the growing disappointment associated to strategic planning practices, may be due to excessive expectations, and 
the difficulties encountered by strategic planning are traced to three main issues: (a) the relationship between politics and 
planning; (b) the relationship between government and governance; and (c) the relationship between space and socio-
economic development. Some authors recently supported an idea of development as consisting in the qualitative evolution of 
forms of social rationality and argued that a reflection about the relationships between physical transformations and visions of 
development could be a way of testing innovations. But such strong demands might be satisfied only if we manage to make a 
«new social and territorial pact for development», recreating a social fabric imbued with shared values. The re-creation of a 
social fabric imbued with shared values requires a rich conception of the political community and the possibility that the moral 
purposes of the community may be incorporated by the state. All this is missing today. Outside a republican scheme planning 
activities are principally instruments for legitimising vested interests and facilitating their investments, and the resolution of 
the conflicts that arise between the planning decisions of the various levels of government becomes at least impracticable. A 
complete planning system can be practised if can be referred to the authority and syntheses expressed in and by statehood, 
which suggests that in a democratic system planning is republican by necessity rather than by choice.  
 
INTRODUCTION
1 
I should begin by telling you about at least two 
limitations of my lecture, one linked to my 
academic and professional background, the 
other to the peculiarities of the country in 
which I have always worked. 
Since I am a planner, and not a regional 
scientist, my approach is first and foremost 
normative. Also, as will emerge from what I am 
about to say, my approach is not 
comprehensive, if by this we mean an attempt 
to consider the economic, social and spatial 
aspects of an urban or territorial issue 
simultaneously. On the contrary, mine is a 
selective approach which considers space as 
the key topic of study, and not as a resource for 
vicariously exploring other topics and 
resources. And, in terms of the possible 
technical practices, space as particularly 
lending itself to ‘regionalisation’ through the 
drawing of boundaries – a practice sure to 
produce political, cultural, social and 
economic effects and. In short, to produce 
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different forms of political and social control 
through control of space. 
Secondly, despite some consultancy work in 
other countries, my practical experience has been 
gained in Italy and especially the north of Italy. 
Spatial planning is an activity too dependent on 
the political, cultural and administrative tradition 
of the context, in which it takes place, to think that 
one country’s planning procedures and methods 
c a n  b e  t r a n s p o s e d  t o  a n o t h e r  o r  e v e n  b e  t h e  
subject of easy comparison. Thoughts about a 
planning case in Milan cannot be compared 
directly with those about one in Belgrade, Paris or 
Berlin. One of the reasons why I am grateful for 
the invitation to speak at this conference is to 
understand how far a dialogue between planners 
operating in different national contexts is possible 
and useful. 
I have mentioned the main limitations of my 
lecture to justify its particularly theoretical 
approach and also to stress that despite the 
theoretical nature of my arguments, they do not 
claim to be universally valid. 
In summary, there are two main ideas that I am 
putting to you: (i) in its practical applications 
strategic planning reveals limits that are hard to 
overcome; (ii) a complete system of planning – 
i.e. the development of national, regional and 
local planning – is possible only in the framework 
of a political, social and government culture that 
is republican. 2 
To develop these ideas I examine three questions 
that highlight the reasons for the current 
difficulties encountered by strategic planning: the 
relationship between politics and planning; the 
relationship between government and 
governance; and the relationship between space 
and socio-economic development. I conclude by 
asserting that a republican approach, founded on 
‘constitutional patriotism’ can restore authority to 
the state as well as legitimacy and meaning to 
planning.
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UNCLEAR STRATEGIES: THREE 
REASONS FOR DIFFICULTIES
1 
The need for overall visions and plans capable 
of steering local and town planning already 
exists at the beginning of the twentieth century 
on both sides of the Atlantic,
2 but practices 
everywhere see relatively similar forms of 
zoning plans. We must wait until the end of the 
‘60s to have the formal distinction between 
structure plan and action plan
3 introduced in 
the British system, and to begin the journey 
towards strategic planning. Strategic planning 
accelerates in the next twenty years when, 
especially in the United States, it seems to 
provide the answer to the problems created for 
planning practices by neoliberal culture.
4 Such 
was the enthusiasm for strategic planning that 
many were led to believe that this alone was 
real planning, and the only form worth 
addressing in the academic and professional 
world.
5 
Enthusiasm is on the wane: the numerous 
instruments falling under the broad label of 
strategic planning have produced results that in 
too many instances have fallen short of 
expectations. After an explosion of ideological 
hostility twenty or thirty years ago, planning now 
has to consider widespread scepticism about its 
efficacy, and a low level of agreement between 
planners themselves about the purposes and use 
of strategic planning. This lack of agreement is 
manifest, for example, in the multitude of 
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2 Geddes’s vision is regional and involves continuity 
between large-scale spatial ordering and the design 
detail of public space: note, continuity and not large 
scale determining small-scale. Olmsted’s idea of a 
general plan focuses particularly on the design of large 
urban areas and anticipates the pairing of the 
comprehensive plan and zoning, where in theory zoning 
should be the detailed and operational translation of the 
general lines proposed by the general plan. 
3 In actual fact the pairing of general plans and detailed 
plans is already witnessed with the Greater London Plan 
1944 and the City of Manchester Plan 1945; in the 
following years it will be the turn of the first subregional 
plans such as the Preliminary Plan for Lancashire 1951. 
The reform introduced by the Town and Country 
Planning Act 1968 is preceded by lengthy debate: see, 
for example, the Royal Town Planning Institute 1976, 
Ministry of Housing et al. 1965. For a theoretical 
framework, see Taylor 1988. In Milan, some of the 
schemes drawn up by De Finetti and by the AR plan in 
the 1940s can be defined as structural schemes, and it 
is singular how the amendment made to the Milan 
General Town Plan by Hazon in 1967 appears in 
substance and also in its graphic expression to be a 
structure plan. 
4 Kaufman, Jacobs, 1987; Bryson, Roering, 1987. 
5 Faludi, van der Valk, 1994. 
definitions offered in the literature. The range of 
interpretations is really far too wide: it sweeps 
from traditional and institutional formulas, linked 
to experiences of subregional and structure 
planning in the sixties, to dubious transpositions 
of business culture to the public sector, not only 
in America. It embraces governance and the 
design of institutions, or communicative 
approaches, without forgetting an emphasis on 
creativity and strategic imagination.
6 
To get over this difficulty Albrechts has written that 
«There is no ‘one way’ or ‘better way’ of strategic 
planning» and «strategic planning can be defined 
as a process guided by the public sector, through 
which a vision, actions, and their means of 
implementation are formulated, giving a form and 
framework to that which a place is and can 
become».
7  In a more recent essay Albrechts 
proposes a normative view of strategic spatial 
planning and indicates its «five main 
characteristics (selective, relational annex 
inclusive, integrative, visioning, and action 
orientated)».
8 But his conclusions are quite 
general and open-ended: «The normative view 
includes a plea for a shift towards a more hybrid 
democracy, for a type of planning that expands 
practical democratic deliberations rather than 
restricts them, and that encourages diverse 
citizens' voices rather than stifles them; that 
directs resources to basic needs rather than to 
narrow private gain; that uses public involvement 
to present real political opportunities, learning 
from action not only what works but also what 
matters».
9  
                                                           
6 Even a few years ago strategic planning was defined 
b y  J o h n  B r y s o n  a s  « a  d i s c i p l i n e d  e f f o r t  t o  p r o d u c e  
fundamental decisions and actions that shape and guide 
what an (entity) is, what it does and why it does it». 
(Bryson, 2003, cited by Healey, 2007, p. 30; but 
likewise Bryson, 1995, pp. 4-5). A definition so closely 
connected with corporate planning as to be of little use 
in the public sector where profit is not the be all and 
end all and where there are a variety of missions often 
competing with each other. In the public sector strategic 
planning can produce satisfactory results only if applied 
to a specific sector with a well defined and relatively 
straightforward mission. For the rest, if we exclude 
forms of economic planning, such as that seen in 
France in the 1950s and 1960s, it has not yet been 
possible to bring the activities of all sectors of public 
administration under the umbrella of overall strategic 
frameworks, capable of increasing the efficiency and 
effectiveness of government and administration. 
7 Albrechts, 2005, p. 268. 
8 Albrechts, 2006, p. 1149. Albrechts uses “building 
blocks from literature (planning and business) and [his] 
experience in practice to construct a workable normative 
definition of the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of strategic spatial 
planning”. 
9 Albrechts, 2006, p. 1165. 
Patsy Healey, who in the past has used the 
expressions ‘strategic planning’ and ‘strategic 
spatial planning’, now prefers ‘strategy-
making’, which she defines as a key activity 
that «focused on urban areas involves creating 
some conception of an ‘urban region’ and 
forming institutional arenas in which to develop 
and maintain the strategic focus».
10  
Recently, Gabriele Pasqui has traced three 
different interpretations of strategic planning: «as 
an institutionalised instrument of territorial 
government; as a governance device capable of 
integrating networks of players and building 
consent around important development strategies; 
and as a practice of ‘societal conversation’ 
capable of selectively activating players and 
resources around new or reinterpreted projects».
11 
A more selective approach is taken by Friedmann 
who, after acknowledging how strategic planning 
has been imported from the business world, 
argues that it is normally used to refer to the key 
issues of spatial planning over a timescale of 20-
30 years.
12 But he emphasises the controversial 
nature of this form of planning and adds: «Some 
see strategic planning as a way to set out an ideal 
vision of the future; others see it as a vehicle for 
generating technical studies that would otherwise 
not be undertaken; still others see it as a way for 
substituting technical for political rationality or, 
alternatively, for undergirding and strengthening 
political reasons with technical studies; a fourth 
group may see it as a way to create a broad 
conceptual framework for wider public discussion 
and/or collaborative planning. And undoubtedly 
there are other purposes that may be claimed».
13 
Considering, among other things, the difficulties 
in drawing up long-term policies and plans, 
Friedmann believes that an approach which 
concentrates on high-priority projects – ‘strategic 
focus’ – is more convincing than 
comprehensiveness, and suggests how to 
develop these through studies that go into greater 
detail. Strategic focus seems better suited to cope 
with the static nature of traditional planning and to 
provide a sufficiently rapid response to problems 
that cannot always be predicted.
14 
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12 And in support he cites Salet and Faludi, 2000; 
Albrechts et al., 2003. 
13 Friedmann, 2005, p. 224. 
14 We ought to ask what the static nature of planning 
consists in and why it has to be overcome. In the case 
of urban planning, its ‘static’ nature, if interpreted and 
used properly, is its strength, but a footnote can only 
touch on this theme and certainly not address it 
properly. Mazza L.: Strategic Planning and Republicanism 
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Uncertainty about the meaning of strategic 
planning is accompanied by an explicit lack of 
confidence about the possibility of applying it in 
practice. For example, in his introduction to a 
research into experience of strategic projects in 
seven European cities, Willem Salet writes that: 
«The evolution of cities is the largely unplanned 
and unintended outcome of more or less 
deliberate actions by many individuals and 
dispersed agencies searching to find a way out of 
the problems and circumstances they experience. 
As such, urban evolution is consciously man-
made and even policy-made in many respects, 
but it does not unfold harmoniously according to 
the lines of a strategic plan. There is no complete 
control, not even in countries where powers are 
shaped to enable hierarchical planning».
15 Salet 
believes, however, that there is a strategic 
dimension of planning practices which lies in «the 
transcendence of individual horizons in scope and 
time»; therefore, he thinks it useful to focus 
attention on framing, by which he simply means 
«the different ways in which individual agents can 
be held together».
16 Salet does not seem to stop 
and consider on what terms and how in the 
current situation a perceptible ‘transcendence of 
individual horizons' could be achieved, with the 
effort that this would require, or, especially, what 
the not inconsiderable political implications of 
that transcendence might be, or the necessary 
repercussions that it would have on the design of 
planning practices and the justification behind 
them. 
Even from these few citations, a situation emerges 
as ramified as it is uncertain; a situation certainly 
explained by a host of reasons, partly inherent to 
technical culture, and partly supplied by the 
political and cultural contexts in which planning 
practices are developed. But it is a situation rather 
too ramified to be convincing, bringing to mind an 
old essay by Wildavsky, ‘If Planning is Everything, 
Maybe it’s Nothing’, one which is much cited but 
which unfortunately has produced no great 
results.
17 
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16 The subject of framing is also the focus of a comment 
offered by Fausto Curti who suggests «creating light 
frames (whether they are called structural or strategic 
plans) capable of having some diagnostic efficacy. 
These frames should especially regard the 
infrastructural and environmental matrices (which also 
involve commitments and constraints for the 
administration)». He then suggests «trying to pilot the 
portfolio of possible options, by exploiting incentives, 
partnerships and competition» (personal 
communication).  
17 Wildasky, 1973. 
Without claiming in any way to exhaust the 
subject, I believe that a critical exploration of 
this situation must begin with careful thought 
about three issues within technical culture: the 
relationship between planning and politics; the 
relationship between government and 
governance; and the relationship between the 
physical and socio-economic aspects, i.e. 
between territory and development. Three 
issues that seem useful in casting light on the 
current predicaments of strategic planning. 
Planning and politics 
A talk on strategic planning is forced to 
consider the shifting boundaries between 
planning activities and political activities as 
well as the equally shifting boundaries between 
techniques and ethics. To a large degree the 
political nature of spatial planning activities is 
linked to their redistributive character and to 
the mechanism of exclusion and inclusion that 
follows from this. The main effects of planning 
practices are therefore political and social, 
rather than economic and spatial. Above all, 
these main effects redesign citizenship,
18 to the 
extent that the undoubted spatial and economic 
effects can be correctly defined as resources 
for pursuing the political and social effects, 
rather than the actual aims of planning. It is 
these political and social effects that make the 
relationship between technical knowledge and 
ethical principles indissoluble; after all, control 
of space has always involved ethical 
assumptions.
19 
If we agree that an ethical framework is 
indispensable to the building and application 
of technical knowledge, this does not mean 
that planning must be so mixed up with politics 
that it becomes ‘a form of politics’. The 
implicit and explicit values and purposes of 
planning knowledge are unrelated to political 
practices and, precisely for this reason, can 
reveal - because they are in agreement or at 
variance with them - the values and purposes 
often implicit in decision-making processes as 
well as the political and ethical implications of 
the decisions under discussion. 
For example, the principle of preserving vestiges 
of the past is based on the ethical value attached 
to those vestiges; if there is a conflict between this 
principle and a decision to redevelop an area, the 
arguments that technical culture may use for or 
against conservation serve to highlight the ethical 
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cost of the decision.
20 In other words, planning 
knowledge serves to raise ethical as well as 
technical questions about decision-making 
processes, but certainly not to replace these 
processes by taking the decisions itself, on a 
technocratic basis. 
If we believe that it is the task of planning to come 
up with visions and strategies for designing the 
future, we are entrusting it with a political role, 
such as proposing values and objectives, and an 
ideal society or city. From a technical perspective, 
this can be an exercise in political philosophy and 
law: to create visions and devise strategies 
planning must bring about syntheses that are not 
technical, but characteristic of societal 
conversation and political debate.
21  Unless the 
approach is technocratic, it is inappropriate to 
entrust technical practice with the task of 
guiding societal conversation about a design 
for the future without the mediation of those 
civil institutions – political parties and clubs, 
cultural associations, pressure groups, etc – to 
which this role is assigned. Importantly, when 
they seek the contribution of experts these 
institutions are not so much interested in the 
                                                           
20 One example is the story of the car park built near the 
Church of Sant’Ambrogio in Milan. The Church and its 
surroundings are one of the sites marking the origins of 
the city, and the memories that they guard have been 
very carefully tended over the last few centuries, as 
expressed by the spatial equilibrium maintained despite 
the numerous and considerable changes witnessed over 
the course of time. One could say that until now the 
piazza of Sant’Ambrogio and its surroundings have been 
an example of particularly good conservation within a 
wider development. The addition of an underground car 
park with entrances in the immediate vicinity of the 
Church seems an excessive risk that could and should 
have been avoided, especially after various negative 
experiences of this kind in the past, such as the ruining 
of the nearby Piazza dei Borromei. One does not have to 
be a Catholic to recognise that the area of 
Sant’Ambrogio is an important monument, to be 
respected and saved from excessive modernisation. 
Evidently, the local authorities did not believe that the 
opening of the car park could result in a ‘disfigurement’ 
and, without any particular justification, went ahead with 
the decision. This case also shows that only widespread 
recollection of the past can defend a city from risky or 
‘wrong’ developments; the opposition of the 
neighbourhood itself is rarely sufficient. 
21 Luca Gaeta observes that if creating visions and future 
strategies is a political task, when undertaken by 
political philosophers and lawyers it cannot become 
more of a technical one than it is when undertaken by 
planners. While acknowledging the sharpness of this 
observation, I believe that a difference lies in the fact 
that when philosophers and lawyers design models of 
an ideal city, they propose them within the context of 
philosophical and legal debate as subjects or examples 
of argument and not as the elements of plans or laws to 
be actually implemented. Mazza L.: Strategic Planning and Republicanism 
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technical merit of their proposals as in the 
likely political consequences. To entrust 
political tasks to technical practice may seem a 
generous decision, showing commitment. But 
it is a decision that, on the one hand, is at risk 
of tumbling into technocratic arrogance and, 
on the other hand, of seeing the technical 
content - still to be found in even frail practices 
such as those of planning - evaporating into 
the common sense of what that content should 
be.
22 
Just as unconvincing, though widely held, is 
the idea that the task of planning might be to 
identify and involve interested parties. To give 
a voice to interested parties and involve them 
in the decision-making process is again a 
political task. It is part of the game that 
politicians are ready to let certain interests 
have a voice and not others.
23 If, for example, 
politicians do not let weak interests have a 
voice, it is not because they are incapable of 
doing so, but because they are not interested 
in doing so. And if politicians do not let weak 
interests have a voice, this does not mean that 
planners, merely because they wish to, are 
politically and technically able and 
institutionally authorised to do so.
24 A planner 
may act as a political advisor or directly as a 
political activist – this is an important 
commitment assumed by many experts in 
every disciplinary field. The problem is not to 
expect a commitment, on the part of an 
individual or a group, to be transformed into 
the institutional goal of the technical practices 
of a professional activity such as planning.
25 
If designing the future and development of a 
society was the job of planning practices, it would 
no longer be possible to trace the boundary 
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proportional to its recourse to moral arguments.  
23 It is probable that the most poorly represented voices 
are those of the weakest interests, but to give a voice to 
these interests is, once again, a typically political rather 
than technical task. To entrust this task to planning in 
the belief that politicians are unable to carry it out 
properly, not only creates a form of unfair competition 
with politicians, but tends to make their unwillingness 
pass for incompetence. 
24 In the end, and depending on their beliefs, even those 
planners who, adhering most strictly to particular 
political decisions, have some political influence on 
their implementation, but this happens because 
everyone, in the course of the work, engages, to some 
extent and sometimes unconsciously, in political 
activity, and not because they believe themselves to be 
institutionally bound to do so. 
25 Mazza, 1995, 2002. 
between planning and political activity. As a 
result planning would be completely absorbed 
by politics, or a situation would arise in which 
the independent contribution, that techniques 
can give to societal conversation and the 
formation of the decision-making process, 
would disappear.
26 The theoretical approach 
that considers planning as a ‘form of politics’ 
is the most explicit expression of the confusion 
between political decision-making processes 
and planning practices. And it is also the safest 
way of denying independence and specificity 
to planning activities. The confusion between 
planning and politics often seems to arise from 
the fact that many planners are not satisfied 
with collaborating in government activities. 
They believe that they should have an 
independent role in devising and implementing 
public strategies. The suspicion arises that this 
may be due, not so much to their irrepressible 
public spirit, as to their inability to understand 
the technical problems and work out useful 
solutions to the questions on the government 
agenda. Moreover, it seems to be forgotten that 
politicians’ decision-making responsibilities 
are based on an electoral mandate, which 
planners do not have. And this is probably the 
most embarrassing aspect of the debate about 
strategic planning. 
Not to consider planning as a form of politics 
does not mean that we should ignore the 
political nature of technical planning 
knowledge or neglect the issue of how to use 
technical knowledge in political dealings, in 
other words the problem of the shifting 
boundaries between techniques and ethics. In 
his work, a planner always refers to ethical and 
p o l i t i c a l  v a l u e s  a n d  a i m s ,  e v e n  i f  h e  i s  n o t  
                                                           
26 It must be acknowledged that in some cases, for the 
most varied reasons and more or less explicitly, 
political decision-makers delegate certain decision-
making powers to experts. And it is not easy to act in 
this situation because there is no formal basis for the 
delegated power, which can thus be withdrawn 
unexpectedly and the expert’s decisions overturned; and 
because the expert often does not have all the necessary 
skills and information to handle the situation properly. 
Moreover, delegated powers are often exercised in 
matters that the political system considers irrelevant, 
with the result that, whatever the expert’s decision, it is 
possible that it may never be implemented. In short, 
only when there is very great trust between decision-
maker and expert can the latter be prompted to accept a 
delegated power that tends to confuse their roles and 
muddy the decision-making process. Acceptance of this 
power provides decision-makers with a form of ‘cover’ 
that can only produce confusion in public debate; 
therefore, as a general rule, it should be politely 
refused. 
always aware of doing so. It is possible that the 
planner’s values and aims agree so closely 
with those of government and the wider 
common sense that the planner is led to 
believe that his action is ethically neutral and 
that his contribution is solely ‘technical’. 
Planning, since it redistributes rights, is 
nonetheless a process of reform, whether 
progressive or conservative. Therefore, the 
state of unawareness can be read as one of 
‘mechanical’ reformism. In the sense of a 
systematic, if not entirely uncritical, 
implementation of values and aims that are 
taken for granted, because they are based on 
values and aims endorsed by majority consent. 
For example, in the last thirty years mechanical 
reformism has been driven by the idea of the 
‘market’ and of every type of reform being 
conditional on the resources, and not just 
financial ones, provided by the ‘market’. In this 
case too, the redesign of citizenship brought 
about by planning is following principles but 
these, paying homage to the ‘value’ of the 
market, establish that citizenship should be 
‘contractualised’. Therefore, individual rights 
are, directly and indirectly, ‘purchased’ on the 
market, for example through insurance 
schemes and contributions in exchange for 
services.
27 Moreover, the production of public 
goods is conditional on the amount of profits 
that the urban market generates. 
Mechanical reformism can be contrasted 
with a critical awareness of the values and 
a i m s  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  p l a n n i n g  p r a c t i c e s .  A n  
awareness that takes values and aims not as 
inalterable givens, but as the products of the 
competing action of political and technical 
practices. This state of awareness can be 
read as one of moral reformism: in other 
words a state in which the expert reflects 
critically on the principles and values 
proposed by societal conversation. To 
reflect critically in this way implies 
acceptance by the expert of theories of state 
and citizenship that form the terms of 
reference for the values and aims of 
planning and the ways of pursuing them.
28 
                                                           
27 See, for example, Somers, 2008. 
28 For moral reformism, the theories of state and 
citizenship are not easy conditions to fulfil. In the final 
part of this lecture I argue that the intrinsic nature of 
spatial planning, an authoritarian instrument of 
governance, reduces the field to republican theory. 
Meaning by that a theory in which, also in compliance 
with the principles of devolution and subsidiarity, the 
collective interest prevails over individual interests. Mazza L.: Strategic Planning and Republicanism 
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To recapitulate. If we assume that planning is 
an instrument of government, when the 
political system and government know how to 
express clear values and aims, planners have 
two alternatives. Either to accept those values 
and aims as givens and to work within that 
reference framework, or, if they are unable to 
share those values and aims, to turn down the 
work. The situation is more complicated when 
politics and government do not know how to 
express clear values and aims. To operate in 
this case, the planner is forced to stand in, an 
action which rarely dispels the uncertainty in 
which the government is mired. Moreover, it is 
very improbable that it will produce any 
significant political results. The government is 
very likely to drop the planner’s proposals or 
only take up those which it thinks will satisfy its 
immediate requirements, ignoring the general 
reference framework from which the planner 
has drawn inspiration.
29 
It could be argued that, in actual fact, there is a 
third alternative, seeking to modify the values 
and aims expressed by government. Anyone 
who pursues this purpose is engaged in 
political activity, regardless of his professional 
role and possible use of technical arguments. 
Once again, it is not a question of preventing 
experts from adopting political positions, but of 
clarifying that these positions are such 
regardless of the technical arguments used. 
This distinction may appear formalistic, but let 
us see how it applies in real life. 
Let us suppose that an advisor has been 
appointed to collaborate in drawing up housing 
policies only to discover that he does not share 
the government’s aims, which he considers to 
be too subservient to the vested interests of 
property companies and too insensitive to the 
issue of social housing. If his attempts to 
convince the administration to change its 
objectives are unsuccessful, all the advisor can 
do is to resign and explain why. To make 
public the reasons for his resignation is a 
legitimate and necessary professional step that 
has an evident political value. But if, after 
resigning, the advisor begins to campaign 
against the administration’s policy, his action 
is that of a political activist who uses technical 
arguments to support the values and aims that 
                                                           
29 In brief, if the political system does not provide 
reference values and goals that the expert considers 
appropriate, there is no space for his planning activity. 
This does not mean that other experts, because of their 
beliefs or for gain, may not share those goals and 
values that the political system recognises and pursues. 
inspire him as a citizen. The problem is not so 
much of ethical professional practice as 
theoretical: if a political activist and a politician 
are entitled to use technical arguments to 
support a political idea, a technical expert who 
does so can convince people that there are 
decisive technical reasons for deciding on a 
public policy, which is almost always false. A 
public policy can be analysed and evaluated 
technically if that means exposing the expected 
costs and benefits, but it cannot be judged 
technically because the judgment of the costs 
or benefits varies according to the values and 
aims pursued politically. 
Government and governance 
In talks about strategic planning the opposition 
between government and governance is almost 
always cited. The opposition emphasises how 
strategic planning no longer refers to a 
government allocating resources and resolving 
problems, but to governance perceived as the 
ability to trigger a search for creative solutions 
by mobilising various players, with different 
and even conflicting interests, objectives and 
strategies.
30 In other words, a narrowing of the 
role of the state in favour of greater social 
involvement in the design of collective action. 
But this is not the only way of understanding 
governance that we find in the literature, with 
the result that we have another polysemic term 
tending to create more problems than it 
manages to resolve.
31  
The opposition between government and 
governance is possible if government is 
caricatured as an autonomous institution cut 
off from its context, autocratic and totally 
unapproachable. The opposition between 
government and governance is of analytical 
value provided that governance is not 
considered as overtaking government, Because 
governance is, if anything, an instrument of 
government, which retains powers and 
responsibilities that no form of governance can 
                                                           
30 Albrechts, 2005, p. 271. 
31 For example, governance is now used not only to 
indicate informal non-vertical ways of organising 
decision-making processes, but to indicate new forms 
of government, so that the distinction between 
governance and government eventually disappears. To 
take account of the different interpretations of 
governance Healey resorts to the expression ‘urban 
governance landscapes’ and acknowledges that the 
«new organisational forms for governance activity raise 
difficult questions about how the accountability and 
legitimacy of such activity can be established and blur 
the boundary between the 'public' and 'private' sectors». 
Healey, 2007, p. 19. 
replace or limit and that, on the contrary, are 
reinforced by good governance.  
Some authors seem to believe that with the 
appearance of governance the processes of 
government have changed. Whereas it is 
primarily our ways of describing them that have 
changed and with positive effect. The links 
between government and vested interests have 
become more explicit and less confused and 
are covered by procedures that tend to render 
them more transparent and more controllable. 
This does not mean that governance itself 
should be able to «trigger a search for creative 
solutions differing by territory»,
32  unless one 
believes that the ‘creativity’ of a public 
decision-making process is proportional to the 
number of interests involved and not to the 
planning and leadership skills of the manager 
of the process. 
Governance and institutional planning are 
useful instruments within the framework of a 
clear and sound political strategy. While in a 
complete turnaround it seems that at times we 
expect that strategy can be the product of 
governance and institutional planning. It is 
possible and desirable for a circular process to 
be triggered between the three components but 
the trigger can only be political strategy. 
Development and space 
Many supporters of strategic planning 
processes identify two dimensions: «One 
dimension of this process is the value attached 
to the qualities of places and to appreciation of 
their diversity; another dimension is the accent 
on integrated socio-economic approaches, 
which go beyond the mere physical dimension 
of traditional planning».
33 In the last ten years, 
perhaps because of the ever increasing number 
of large-scale town plans, there has been a 
particular focus on ‘places’, whose qualities 
and differences have been emphasised. Healey 
stresses the role of places in connection with 
strategy-making, which she considers to be 
«the development and deployment of a 
strategic imagination about the qualities of the 
places of urban areas».
34 
The first dimension revisits themes already 
dear to early twentieth century authors, such as 
Geddes and Unwin, and ever present in Italian 
culture. In reverting to them now we ought to 
be aware that these themes did not become 
                                                           
32 Albrechts, 2005, p. 271 
33 Albrechts, 2005, p. 269. 
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less topical due to lack of attention or 
knowledge, but because of choices made in 
the context of modernist poetics and social 
philosophies characterised by egalitarian 
welfarism. To consider the quality and diversity 
of places is a choice based on values and 
objectives. From a technical perspective, to 
consider the quality and diversity of places is 
just as valid as not doing so. For example, it 
was not considering − or only very partially 
considering  − them that enabled the 
construction of the «autostrada del sole», the 
‘Motorway to the Sun’ which linked the north 
and south of Italy for the first time. Therefore it 
is incorrect to assume that this dimension is a 
technical aspect of strategic processes; rather, 
it can be traced to the ‘poetics’ of planning.  
The second dimension − the accent on 
integrated approaches − was widespread in the 
early twentieth century among English 
planners, even though they had been trained in 
the schools of architecture and engineering. It 
was then lost before re-emerging in the issues 
addressed in the British debate, between the 
end of the ‘50s and early ‘60s, about 
recovering and integrating the socio-economic 
contents and effects of land-use decisions. 
This was the debate that would lead to the 
subregional strategic plans of the ‘60s and to 
structure planning. If nowadays we are again 
addressing the same topics, we have to ask 
ourselves why in the span of a century we have 
not made some advances in the process of 
integrating physical and socio-economic 
questions. 
The associations between the physical and 
socio-economic dimensions are taken up 
within a wider and more problematic 
consideration of the associations between the 
processes of developing territory and 
governing territory, the subject of two essays 
by Palermo and Pasqui. Their argument is that 
ways and forms of thinking about possible 
contamination between the two planning logics 
are still very unsatisfactory.
35  
For Palermo «the very unsatisfactory results of 
integrated territorial development programmes 
in Italy, are over the last ten years perhaps 
partly due to certain limitations cited here. On 
the one hand, a certain overestimate of the 
wealth of identity, and quality and relational 
capability of local systems. On the other hand, 
the generally artificial and often opportunistic 
nature of networks and contingent coalitions; 
                                                           
35 Palermo, Pasqui, 2008, p. 5. 
as well as the difficulty in interpreting and 
managing multi-scale and multi-level dynamic 
relationships».
36  Pasqui, in particular, 
complains about the excessive number of 
instruments used in the last few years and their 
negative results, and the terms that he uses to 
describe these results are ‘failure’ and 
‘washout’.
37 According to Pasqui, the errors 
can be traced to three factors. First, the 
inadequacy of the main human and procedural 
components of government processes. 
Second, the inability of technical cultures to 
acquire a thorough grasp of the nature of 
planning topics and their differences in order 
to handle them properly.
38 Third, the idea itself 
of reform, too little attentive to social 
intelligence, and to the embedding and 
institutionalisation of development policies.  
Pasqui’s observations are thoroughly 
convincing when they address general 
questions such as those just described, while 
they are a source of perplexity, mainly for the 
reasons already set out in the section on 
‘politics and planning’, when they address 
technical questions. If, on the one hand, mixing 
political and technical themes enriches 
political argumentation, which is better 
                                                           
36 Ivi, p. 109. 
37 Palermo, Pasqui, 2008: «… the consequences of this 
overlapping of instruments which are often very similar, 
but characterised by different sources of financing and 
procedures, have been numerous and almost all 
negative. … a factor of uncertainty, instead of a vehicle 
for collective learning» (pp. 20-21) And with regard to 
new planning and integrated development policies, «the 
steps taken over the last fifteen years can hardly be 
called a success» (p. 25) and on the following page: 
«the experience of territorial development policies 
could actually be considered a total wash-out». An 
absence of leadership, partnerships incapable of 
building coalitions, inadequate project management, 
processes of institutionalisation that in certain cases 
become a brake, and unnecessarily complicated and 
unsatisfactory vertical relationships, are some of the 
main reasons behind the regulation mechanism break-
downs that have represented «factors of uncertainty and 
instability» (p. 30). Pasqui believes that the connection 
between territorial development and transformation has 
been largely overlooked and that there has been a 
failure to «interpret productively the possible forms of 
contamination between the two design logics, because 
of the limits having to do with institutions and politics; 
with interests and with society; and with forms of 
knowledge and forms of technical rationality» (p. 31). 
38 «The missing link between analysis and design of 
policies and substantive interpretation of territorial 
development dynamics, in all their variety and 
ramifications and their physical effects on the territory, 
is perhaps precisely the area in which we need to 
invest, also in terms of qualified personnel and training 
strategies» (Ivi, p. 80).  
constructed and more persuasive as a result, 
on the other hand it burdens planning activities 
with expectations that are too high and 
historically bound to end in disappointment. 
‘Societal conversation’ is a political activity 
that is possible when the relevant players are 
willing to debate the chosen subject, but this 
willingness is increasingly rare, especially in 
large cities. The impression is that many 
strategic planning approaches refer more to an 
imaginary society than real society. 
Does not happen for that in the last few years 
disappointment with general strategies has 
resulted in a shift of attention to specific 
strategies and especially strategic projects that 
attempt to treat an area according to its main 
functional aspects: activity and mobility. 
Strategic projects very ambitiously present 
themselves as integrated development 
projects. Despite citing functional and 
symbolic values, they actually are above all 
instruments for breeding capital. In the 
majority of cases large urban projects, justified 
by plans, are strategic above all to their 
investors. Even though they have significant 
implications for urban dynamics, in terms of 
public costs rather than benefits. Politically, 
they use the cover provided by neoliberal 
culture by the emphasis on partnerships 
between the public and private sectors, and by 
the processes of subsidiarity and 
modernisation. Rarely they are based on 
overall visions and rarely their possible effects 
are evaluated in advance. In the majority of 
cases in Italy, they are explicit forms of 
privatisation of the processes of urban 
transformation. 
If the technical contribution merely recognises 
the interdependent aspects of these large urban 
projects – economic and social action, spatial 
configuration, and institutional agreement – in 
order to handle them more efficiently, it ends 
up in their tow. Therefore, rather than resigning 
and restricting ourselves to mere analysis after 
the event, the problem seems to be that of 
identifying what the collective goal of large 
urban works might be, so as to base their 
design on this goal and use it as an instrument 
for evaluating them. I shall return to this point 
later on. 
Palermo’s article, though using technical 
arguments, is not only a reflection about 
territorial and development policies, but a 
political essay.
39  With reference to Donolo, 
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Palermo proposes an idea of development 
consisting in the «qualitative evolution of forms of 
social rationality» and a reflection about «the 
relationships between physical transformations 
and visions of development» that could be «a way 
of putting innovations and hopes to the test».
40 For 
Donolo, and for Palermo, reference to the 
principles of economic efficiency and public 
authority (i.e. the traditional roles of the market 
and state) is not enough. Other «mechanisms of 
social regulation must be considered, in the 
context of reciprocity, and capacity for self-
organisation and networking».
41 Lastly, according 
to Palermo, to usher in a new season of 
development policies it is necessary to 
implement the following principles: «shared 
strategic vision, hierarchy and selectivity of 
investments, subsidiarity of commitments and 
responsibilities, and a federation of sector policies 
on a territorial basis».
42 With the warning that such 
strong demands can be satisfied only if we 
manage to make a «new social and territorial pact 
for development», and to recreate a social fabric 
imbued with shared values. 
REPUBLICANISM AND PLANNING 
SYSTEMS 
However, the re-creation of a social fabric imbued 
with shared values is a purely political theme. It 
requires a rich conception of the political 
community and the possibility that the moral 
purposes of the community may be incorporated 
by the state. All this is missing today. During the 
last few centuries the state has become a secular 
state, a state which no longer has a religious or 
ethical basis. The secularisation process and 
emancipation of the individual create the need for 
a new community and homogeneity of secular 
values, which, in place of religious ones, may 
serve as a basis for state action. 
Everyday experience shows that even a secular 
state accepts certain ethical assumptions, and its 
citizens participate in public conversations which 
have ethical contents. It has been observed that 
this need for values generates an internal 
contradiction: to develop its action the state needs 
to support it with certain ethical assumptions, 
                                                           
40 Ivi, pp. 103-104. 
41 Ivi, p. 106. The market «may not be able to ensure 
sustainable development processes»; it is necessary for 
society and politics to come into play. For Donolo, 
territory is «a matrix and constituent form of social 
complexity, a heritage of common goods exposed to 
various levels of relationships, a dynamic network of 
spatial and temporal flows that requires an ability to 
govern processes» (p. 105). 
42 Ivi, p. 120. 
without which its power might be delegitimised. 
But it is not difficult to discover that, to legitimise 
its action, a democratic secular state demands 
values and presuppositions which it cannot 
reproduce and guarantee.
43  In their debates, 
political philosophers have held for some time 
that the non-denominational or secularised state 
has therefore a need for «meta-political 
references, without which its power is at risk of 
undergoing a delegitimisation process».
44 
Nowadays this contradiction, which the state 
cannot solve on its own, is if possible even more 
glaring. It reverberates through ideas of 
citizenship, which have always been developed 
with reference to notions such as political 
community and the common good. Due to a lack 
of shared value systems, these notions are 
nowadays increasingly problematic, with the 
consequence that planning activities have less 
legitimacy than in the past and have lost their 
basic term of reference: public interest.
45 
A solution to the internal contradiction between the 
need for values to support state action and the 
inability of the state to guarantee these necessary 
values, has been sought by resorting to the classic 
model of “civil religion”.
46 Ten years ago Rusconi 
proposed that the concepts of republicanism and 
civil religion be retrieved, reformulated as «models 
potentially capable of supplying common motives 
(‘presupposed values’) for politics, and of 
producing ties between citizens that go beyond 
their ethical visions. Values that in the language of 
republicanism are called the virtues of public spirit 
and civic integration».
47  
Underpinning the republican outlook is, instead 
of civil religion, constitutional patriotism: 
                                                           
43 Bockenforde, 1986, p. 121.  
44 Rusconi, 1999, p. 40. 
45 Vujosevic, 2004. The description he gives of the 
shortcomings of planning is valid outside the confines 
of Yugoslavia, but one comes away with the impression 
that the author’s idea of planning is too demanding. 
46 In the American experience a reply to this need has 
been granted by the classic model of “civil religion”, 
which is an official fusion of values and religious 
formulas and of the democratic “faith”. In the French 
experience we find a secular republican variant of the 
same reply. Where there was no “civil religion” this 
homogeneity was initially guaranteed by the idea of 
nation; the unity of nation was a substitute for unity 
based on religion. When the building process of the 
nation-state was concluded, the democratic secular 
state tried to find in a community of values and beliefs 
its basis and legitimisation. 
47 Ivi, p. 7. According to Rusconi «Republicanism and 
civil religion have the same roots. They are two ways of 
promoting the idea of civic integration and civism» 
(p. 47). 
finding oneself to be part of a shared history 
and feeling a political obligation to implement 
the constitutional contract. In short, the 
republican paradigm is revisited «from two 
essential angles: redefinition of the nature of 
the ties of citizenship and acknowledgement of 
a shared history identified as being the history 
of a nation».
48 A position partly recalling that of 
Taylor, who says that patriotism consists in 
collective identification with a historical 
community founded on certain values,
49 adding 
immediately afterwards that the essential 
values of that community must include liberty. 
In the republican tradition, in the context of the 
rule of law, citizenship and liberty are generally 
considered as equivalent terms, and the law as 
a source of liberty
.50  
In referring to Rusconi’s proposal I am 
attempting to find an answer to the difficulties 
that spatial planning encounters when it tries to 
raise itself above the local dimension and to 
constitute a system that carries coherent and 
cooperative visions and decisions across the 
various levels of government.
51 Developing 
strategies is very difficult, not to say 
impossible, if the state does not retrieve its 
authority and commitment to coordinating 
planning functions at all levels. Designing and 
implementing coherent strategies requires a 
community with common motives, capable of 
producing bonds between citizens and limiting 
as well as providing scope for individual and 
group behaviour. 
When one believes that the ultimate, even if 
unconscious, purpose of planning is to 
redesign citizenship, a republican approach 
seems necessary precisely in order to 
rediscover common motives among citizens 
and restore authority to the state. If a new 
social contract is required in order to develop 
                                                           
48 Rusconi, 1999, p. 26. Rusconi writes of the «politics 
of history» … in the sense of «keeping in mind a path 
of history open to conflicting interpretations, but at the 
same time not losing sight of the value of republican 
democracy as the point of arrival and the criterion for 
judgment» (p. 96). 
49 Taylor, 1989, cited by Habermas, 2001, p. 116. For a 
comparison between the liberal and republican models, 
see also Sandel, 2005 and Vertova, 1999. 
50 Pettit, 1997, pp. 36-39. With the side note that, 
according to Pettit, republicans are less concerned with 
freedom from interference than freedom from dominium 
(Dagger, 2002, p. 147). 
51 In Italy territorial planning is entrenched almost 
exclusively at local level. There are no forms of national 
territorial planning, even for those key services that 
require it, and regional territorial planning is often a 
fiction. Mazza L.: Strategic Planning and Republicanism 
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planning, and especially to design and 
implement strategies, I believe that the meta-
political pre-conditions for this involve the 
creation of a cultural and social context 
typical of the republican tradition; also 
because it is this tradition that embraces an 
idea of citizenship which, more than any 
other, can be adopted as an analytical and 
normative standard for constructing and 
evaluating planning decisions. 
As an alternative to liberal, social democratic, 
communitarian and ethical approaches, a 
republican approach is certainly one possible 
choice; but even with regard to the mere 
notion of citizenship, it must be 
acknowledged that a republican approach is 
anything but unambiguous in the literature.
52 
Various authors identify the features of the 
republican model and contrast them with the 
liberal model. Taylor and Habermas, for 
example, highlight the instrumental nature of 
institutions in the liberal approach, while in 
the republican approach participating in 
g o v e r n m e n t  i s  s e e n  a s  a n  e s s e n t i a l  
component of the role of a citizen, as a value 
in itself and as the essence of liberty.
53  
According to Sandel, the republican idea of 
liberty consists in participating in self-
government, an idea that in itself is not 
inconsistent with the liberal idea of freedom.
54 
Vertova does not hesitate to use the term 
republican within a liberal approach,
55 and 
Dagger coins a sort of oxymoron, republican 
liberalism, based on the common 
commitment by both theories to the rule of 
law. But Dagger is forced to conclude that 
republican liberalism cannot be a satisfactory 
form of liberalism, since it involves a vision, 
even if perfectible, of a good society.
56  
 
                                                           
52 See Bobbio, Viroli, 2003. 
53 In contrast with an individualistic and instrumentalist 
concept of the role of citizen, characteristic of the liberal 
model, there is a communitarian and ethical concept 
typical of the republican model; whereas for liberals 
political citizenship is a form of membership on which 
the citizen’s legal position is founded, for republicans it 
is membership of an ethical and cultural community 
which is self-determined. «The reference point for the 
republican concept is the problem of self-organisation 
of society, once it has been admitted that the substance 
of the concept of citizenship should be sought in the 
political rights of participation and communication» 
(Habermas, 2001, pp. 113-125).  
54 Sandel, 2005, p. 10. 
55 Vertova, 1999. 
56 Dagger, 1997. 
Therefore, the multiple meanings of 
citizenship accompanying the Republican 
model are no less ambiguous when a 
comparison is made with the liberal model. 
However, crucial to the republican model is the 
theme of self-government, which can 
constitute a benchmark for evaluating public 
policies, in the sense that it holds out the 
option of considering good policies to be those 
functional above all to the development of 
democracy as self-government. For example, 
improvement of the population’s living 
conditions, as pursued according to the social 
democratic concept of equality, does not in 
itself ensure self-government. 
In the republican approach, improving living 
conditions is not considered a pre-condition 
for exercising political citizenship. Rather 
than the objective of social citizenship, as a 
pre-condition for exercising political 
citizenship, the objective of the republican 
approach is the exercising of an active 
political citizenship. The difference is not 
marginal because it is assumed that political 
citizenship may/must be exercised also in 
unfavourable economic and social conditions, 
and that in any event it must be this that 
produces an improvement in those 
conditions.
57 In the liberal tradition and the 
social democratic one, citizenship is often 
reduced to different forms of 
contractualisation linked to the market and the 
state, while in the republican model 
citizenship involves substantive participation 
in the community.
58 
The theme of self-government does not conflict 
with constitutional patriotism because the 
republican idea of citizenship cannot be 
separated from the idea of being a member of a 
nation. And especially because obligations 
play a role in the public life of the community, 
alongside and before the rights of citizens.
59 
But active conceptions of citizenship may not 
be distinguishable from ethical and 
communitarian conceptions, and the risk of 
over-estimating the dimension of local 
community is ever present. For example, 
Walzer, following a long-standing tradition, has 
proposed recognising neighbourhood, district 
and ethnic communities as effective political 
                                                           
57 This theme is developed by Brandeis and Croly, the 
two advisors to Woodrow Wilson and Theodore 
Roosevelt during the presidential race in 1912; their 
common concern was what type of citizens the 
organisation of the economy would have generated. 
58 Delanty, 2000, p. 9. 
59 Hindess, 1993, pp. 26-28; Bellamy, 1993, p. 71. 
and moral bodies, and he believes that 
community is probably the most important of 
the goods that are distributed. But he adds that 
distribution is in the hands of the majority of 
the citizens of a country and that it would be 
unrealistic to think of communities with 
completely open boundaries.
60 
Despite these variations and ambiguities, the 
republican approach is still indispensible to 
thinking about a new social contract in which, 
also in line with the principles of devolution 
and subsidiarity, the collective interest prevails 
over the individual interest, and also to thinking 
about a form of planning that is acknowledged 
to have the redesign of citizenship as its 
ultimate goal. Outside a republican scheme, 
planning activities are principally instruments 
for legitimising vested interests and facilitating 
their investments. And, outside the republican 
scheme, the resolution of the conflicts that 
arise between the planning decisions of the 
various levels of government becomes at least 
impracticable.  
Planning can generally be practised if it is 
possible to refer to the authority and 
syntheses expressed in and by statehood, 
which suggests that in a democratic system 
p l a n n i n g  i s  r e p u b l i c a n  b y  n e c e s s i t y  r a t h e r  
than by choice. One could reasonably object 
that a republican choice is a political choice 
to which planning can only adapt itself. But 
cultural processes are not so linear, even if 
technical culture takes part in the societal 
conversation that chooses the political 
models of living.
61  
I believe it is legitimate to argue that there are 
no stand-alone principles of planning, and 
that any general principle can only be worked 
out in terms of political philosophy and 
metaphysics. One can consider a planning 
system to be efficient if it facilitates the 
operations of the urban market, or one can 
consider it to be efficient if it favours 
transparent forms of self-government. One 
can consider expropriation to be a violent 
form of state intervention that disrupts the 
market and damages ownership rights, or one 
can consider expropriation, when properly 
compensated, to be an input towards the 
production of the goods and rights that 
                                                           
60 Walzer, 1983, p. 39. 
61 For example, even recently in Italy, many difficulties 
were encountered during an attempt to draw up a ‘law 
setting out the principles for governing the territory’, 
because of the difficulty in identifying convincing 
planning principles. Mazza L.: Strategic Planning and Republicanism 
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nourish citizenship.
62 One can consider town 
planning to be instrumental to the functional 
transformation of space and particularly 
attractive aesthetic results. Or one can consider 
town planning to be instrumental to the 
reinforcement of constitutional patriotism, by 
respecting the traces left by history in the 
urban form and, for example, by making 
changes in the form conditional upon 
functional and symbolic v a l u e s  h e l d  t o  b e  
important in terms of self-government.
63 
Even if it is not the task of planning to 
contribute directly to the political debate on the 
approaches that must form the reference 
framework for the action of government, 
technical planning culture has a responsibility 
to clarify which theoretical approaches should 
underpin the principles on which techniques 
base the models for possible planning systems 
and which principles these models wish to 
follow.
64 
CONCLUSIONS 
The paper argues that the difficulties 
encountered by strategic planning may be 
mainly explained by the characters of three 
uneasy relationships: planning and politics, 
government and governance, development 
policies and spatial planning. In the last 
decades many planners have been thinking that 
their judgement might be better than 
politicians’, because of their technical 
knowledge and moreover because their 
cleverer skills in involving, understanding and 
representing the public. Planners have been 
assuming to have the right and the duty, as 
planners, of participating in planning decisions 
on the same standing as politicians. In this 
perspective it is understandable to prospect an 
opposition between governance and 
government, forgetting that without the 
                                                           
62 Compatible with republicanism is the notion of 
citizenship consisting in the «right of access to 
particular goods in the form of rights (civil, social, 
political) which are waiting to be generated. To be 
citizens does not only mean enjoying one’s goods and 
rights but making a committed contribution to 
generating them. Rights are costly goods and 
commitment by citizens to assuming their share of the 
cost … is … a form of behaviour intrinsic to the status 
of citizens, who recognise that they are bound by ties of 
reciprocity» (Walzer, 1983, p. 35). 
63 See Mazza, 2007. 
64 For example, the principles of transparency, 
efficiency, cooperation, argumentation of choices, etc, 
which the planning system must follow and which allow 
the efficient pursuit of the values expressed by the 
political system. 
government authority planning may be only a 
more or less convincing propaganda. Focusing 
on ambitious development and spatial policies 
planners may forget that actual planning 
actions are a political choice the government 
may or may not take. Planning is not a 
governments’ compulsory task, and 
governments often use planning as a ‘window 
dressing’ to introduce and cover their real 
policies. What governments cannot escape is 
land use control which is an indispensable 
component of national and local geopolitics, 
but the need of property defence and territorial 
control are not sufficient to support a complete 
planning system. Local spatial planning is 
somewhat necessary, but the development and 
implementation of consistent national, 
regional, and local policies and the solution of 
inevitable conflicts within the government tiers, 
demands a shared idea of public interest, 
which only a republican culture can provide. 
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